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The Valuation Impact of Joint Ventures
ABSTRACT
Joint ventures are partial business combinations. Two or more
entities form a business venture in the corporate or partnership form.
The potential value and problems associated with this undertaking are
discussed. A sample of 415 joint ventures, both domestic and inter*-
national, are analyzed to determine the valuation consequences of this
activity. The partition of the sample into domestic and international
ventures provides little evidence that international joint ventures
provide any valuable diversification benefits from the viewpoint of
the shareholder in the short run.

I. INTRODUCTION
Business combinations have long been a prominent topic of interest,
and have stimulated a substantial body of theoretical and empirical
literature. In contrast to the extensive literature on mergers and
tender offers, there has been relatively little attention to joint ven-
tures, which are partial combinations. This paper addresses this gap
in the finance literature by considering the financial characteristics
of joint ventures and then examining several hypotheses regarding
stockholder wealth effects associated with such combinations. The
importance of the joint venture in the international arena with respect
to the diversification benefits which accrue to the shareholder is
analyzed.
Joint ventures are partial business combinations wherein two or
more firms form a profit-motivated entity after negotiating the finan-
cial and legal terms of the combination. This provides an opportunity
to combine resources in optimal proportions rather than in the fixed
portfolio positions dictated by a merger or tender offer. The par-
ticipants are partners rather than an acquirer and a target, and thus
the formation of a joint venture does not provide the opportunity for
one party to be the aggressor as in whole unit combination. The dif-
fering nature of the relationship between the parties and the selective
resource combination indicates that the wealth effects of joint ven-
tures may be different from those predicted by whole-unit combination.
The following section reviews the evolution of the joint venture
form of organization and the related literature. After the development
of the hypotheses, the data and methodology are detailed. The empirical
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results and their interpretation follow and conclusions are drawn in
the final section.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT VENTURES
This paper emphasizes the relationship between partial business
combination by joint venture and whole-unit business combinations by
merger and acquisition. As a context for the analysis, the following
has particular relevance:
•
During the 1950 's many enterprises focused on internal
organization structure, such as divisions and subsid-
iaries, as one means of achieving growth and diversi-
fications. The 1960's brought a new concentration on
external growth in the form mergers and acquisitions
—
which is still in mode today. In recent years, the
joint venture is attracting greater attention as a
beneficial form of organization (Young and Bradford,
1977, p. vi).
In the 1970's, there was a relatively high level of joint venture
formation and this continues. The F.T.C. records joint ventures that
result in the formation of a new corporation and that involve at least
one U.S. participant corporation. Table 1 shows the number of joint
ventures recorded by the F.T.C. over the years 1972-1981 (Federal Trade
Commission, Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions , 1981, p.
175).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Several reasons for joint venture formation have been posited in
press releases and the practitioner literature. These include the
facilitation of technological transfer, developing market structure,
international diversification, and partial divestiture. Joint ventures
TABLE 1
JOINT VENTURES RECORDED BY THE F.T.C.
Year Number of Ventures
1972 289
1973 • 247
1974 130
1975 82
1976 106
1977 115
1978 114
1979 85
1980 183
1981 212
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appear to provide many testable hypotheses both domestic and inter-
national and will likely be the subject of considerable research in the
future.
The nature of joint venture raises many of the legal issues asso-
ciated with mergers. In U.S. vs Penn-Olin Co. (1964), it was construed
taht section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to joint ventures, and in
monitoring joint venture activity, the F.T.C. applies provisions that
are similiar to those relating to whole-unit combination. It has been
noted that:
Joint ventures continue to constitute one of the most
perplexing subjects in antitrust. An inquiry into joint
venture theory must encompass an analysis of both
structural (i.e., merger) and conduct (i.e., collusion)
elements of antitrust. Utilized in the past to effec-
tuate domestic and international cartels, joint ventures
may also promote economic efficiency
.
Caves (1982) discusses the impact of U.S. antitrust policy on the
multinational firm:
A series of cases after W.W.II attacked joint ventures
that U.S. MNEs had formed with their overseas competi-
tors. Some of these deals simply implemented agreements
to divide markets and exclude foreign competitors from
the United States, in which case domestic economic
welfare was the main issue. Other joint ventures,
however, had bolstered U.S. MNE's ability to extract
rents from foreign markets. The courts specifically
rejected the contention that laws allowing U.S. pro-
ducers to collude in export sales justified joint or
collusive behavior in establishing subsidiaries over-
seas. In short, U.S. antitrust policy has taken
appreciable chances of losing rent from foreign markets
in order to promote competition in the domestic economy.
Joint venture formation also raises significant issues in labor
law. As succession applies to merger and divestiture, it also applies
to joint venture. However, the issues are less settled and con-
siderable attention to resolution can be expected in the near future.
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Since these legal concerns can influence the nature of particular trans-
actions (or even whether they take place), they are of direct concern
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to the resolution of uncertainty and its financial implications.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
As partial business combinations, joint ventures may be studied
within the context of the extensive literature on whole unit com-
binations. Many studies have addressed financial issues relating to
mergers and tender offers. These include those by Bradley (1980), Dodd
(1980), and Dodd and Ruback (1977). For whole-unit combination, there
is consistant evidence of positive wealth effects for target firm
stockholders, but little or no impact on the wealth of stockholders of
acquirer firms. Joint venture formation is a significantly different
transaction from mergers and tender offers, and the wealth impacts for
stockholders of the parent firms participating in a joint venture may
not be clearly predicted by the existing literature.
A literature has evolved in economics addressing the impact of
joint ventures on market structure, competition, and technological
transfer. Patterns of joint venture formation have been analyzed and
questionnaires employed to evaluate experience with this organizational
structure. Some analysis of the impact of organizational form on
accounting based measures of rate of return have been undertaken.
Armour and Teece (1978) analyze the effects of multi-divisional organi-
zation on return on equity in the oil industry. They discern a slight
positive relationship between return on equity and the adoption of
multi-divisional organizational form. Their hypotheses related to the
concerns of agency theory. To the extent that joint ventures facilitate
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multi-divisional organization, their results suggest a positive impact
of joint venture. Berg and Friedman (1981) addressed domestic joint
ventures, and in order to concentrate on the nature of the joint ven-
ture, partitioned their sample into two categories "knowledge acquisi-
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tion and other. Using return on equity as the dependent variable,
they found that the former type is associated with lower return on
equity, the latter with higher. This study contrasts with the above in
that it employs risk-adjusted and market-based returns, and it con-
trasts domestic with international joint venture.
Caves (1982) presents the arguments for and against a multinational
organization forming a joint venture. Arguments for include: 1)
enconomizing on managerial or other human contributions, 2) risk
minimization of extremely risky investments, 3) diversification of
sources of supply, 4) overcoming large initial investments, 5) over-
coming lack of certain skill or expertize, 6) governmental requirement
and 7) economizing on information requirements or expertize about foreign
investments. Arguments against the formation of joint ventures include:
1) the possession of an intangible asset puts the joint venture partner
at risk because the other partner may steal the idea or expertize, 2)
joint control may be troublesome, 3) the free rider problem, 4) world-
wide versus local points of view, 5) transfer pricing problems and 6)
host government regulation.
Weighing the costs and benefits and pros and cons of forming a
joint venture is an interesting area of inquiry. However the fact
remains that a large number of firms elected the joint venture form,
and an important question is how did the firms shareholders react to
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the information about the joint venture in the short run. Did the
shareholders preceive the joint venture as a favorable course of action
perhaps providing diversification benefits which was not otherwise
available. Or did they perceive the joint venture in a negative light
as the firm was giving up something of value. The latter relies on the
shareholders predisposition to the idea of the joint venture. The
former relies on the degree of imperfection or market segmentation per-
ceived by the shareholder. A third alternative is that the joint ven-
ture per se did not add anything of value from the short run perspec-
tive of the firm's shareholders.
There has been considerable analysis of the extent to which inter-
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national capital markets are segmented by national boundaries. When
international capital markets are less than completely and directly
integrated, investor alternatives are constrained and some investment
opportunities may be possible only indirectly by holding the stock of
firms with multinational operations. If multinational operations do
enable a firm to provide investors with valuable diversification ser-
vices (i.e., a dominating opportunity set), then this will be reflected
in the stock price of such firms. Hughes, Logue, and Sweeney (1975)
tested several hypotheses and concluded that multinational companies do
provide a service for investors. The investigation of multinational
operations has received further attention in studies such as Adler and
Dumas (1975), Dumas (1978), and Lee and Sachdeva (1977). In this
multinational context, a joint venture with a foreign participant pro-
vides an opportunity to increase the level of foreign operations and
potentially the value of diversification benefits to investors. We are
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thus provided with the opportunity to further investigate empirical
evidence on the provision of valuable diversification services by
multinational operations by the means of a joint venture.
IV. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF JOINT VENTURES
The anticipated effect of domestic joint venture activity depends
on whether the impact is expected to be similar to that' experienced by
the target or the acquirer in a whole-unit combination. With joint
venture formation, there is not the potential aggressor role for one
party and thus strategies of corporate control do not directly impact
on the decision regarding participation. Stockholder voting is not
involved and the decision is made by management. The parties par-
ticipate on a voluntary basis and the venture is presumably subject to
capital budgeting criteria. The effects of joint venture participation
for stockholder wealth will depend on whether it is a positive net pre-
sent value project (i.e., plotting above the security market line) or a
zero net present value project (as the majority of the evidence suggests
for acquirer firm in mergers). It seems plausible to expect that a
negative net present value venture would not be entered into. Deter-
mining whether domestic joint ventures are positive or zero net present
value projects is an underlying goal of this study. We proceed with
the null hypothesis that joint venture formation is a zero net present
value project with no stockholder wealth impacts.
In addition to the overall research question regarding the present
value of domestic joint ventures, the potential for joint ventures to
be a vehicle for the provision of valuable international diversifi-
cation services to home country investors requires investigation. To
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test the hypothesis that joint ventures with foreign partners provide
diversification services, we contrast the valuation impacts of joint
ventures with domestic partners with those where foreign partners are
participants. This is a joint hypothesis of the net present value and
diversification service provision of joint ventures with foreign
partners.
V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample for this study was identified from the F.T.C. Statistical
Report on Mergers and Acquisitions. This includes joint ventures that
result in the formation of a new corporation and where at least one of
the venturers is a domestic firm. Additional criteria employed in this
study were that the firms be NYSE or ASE listed firms and that public
announcements regarding the joint ventures were reported in the Wall
Street Journal . The day on which the first press report regarding the
joint venture is made in the Wall Street Journal is the announcement
date. As is usual in studies of this type, there is some ambiguity
regarding the trading day when the announcement occurs. If the press
release was made before the close of trading on the day before it was
reported in the Wall Street Journal , then the actual event day is -1.
The application of the above criteria to the F.T.C. recorded joint ven-
tures over the period 1976-1979 resulted in a total sampleof 208 joint
venture transactions. The daily returns for the individual joint ven-
turers and the value weighted return for the market portfolio both came
from the CRSP (Center for Research into Security Prices) tapes.
In order to test the hypotheses of this study, the pattern of
abnormal returns over the 101 trading day interval from 50 days before
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to 50 days after (-50, 50) the even is derived and analyzed. It is
assumed that the one-factor market model is a valid representation of
the return generating process. The model is presented below.
R. = a. + B.R „ + e. (1)
Jt j j mt jt
where:
R. = The rate of return on security j over period t, the
unit being one trading day.
R = The rate of return on the value weighted market port-
mt - , . ,folio over day t.
6. = Covariance (R. , R ) /Variance (R )
J J t mt mt
a. = E(R.) - B.E(R J
J j j mt
e. = The residual return on security i in period t.
Jt
The assumptions relating to e are:
E( ;jt ) = o
Var(e. ) = a.
Cov(e R ) =
Jt mt
The use of the model is based on the assumption of bivariate normality
of both security and portfolio returns. In recognition of the sta-
tionarity assumptions of the market model, and the potential impact on
estimation of the announcement event, the model is estimated twice.
Defining day to be the announcement trading day, the respective esti-
mation intervals are (-200, -51) and +51, +200).
For each trading day t in (-50, 50), the abnormal return for firm
j is:
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AR. = R. - (a. + p.R )
Jt jt 3 1 nit
where:
a. and B. are estimated over (-200, -51) for t e (-50, 0)
a. and 8. are estimated over ( + 51, +200) for t ?. (+1, +50)
J J
For each trading day t (-50, 50) the average abnormal return is defined
as:
» N
AR. = AR = 1/N r l AR.
J c t t j t
where:
N = the number of firms with an abnormal return defined in
t day t
.
The cumulative average abnormal return is defined as:
t
CAR Z AR
C t~50 l
The cumulative average abnormal return over the interval t. to t
inclusive is:
C
2
C
2CAR = ST AR
i t=-tl
The interval has length L = t - t + 2. This reflects the requirement
that t_ does not precede t in event time.
To test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns in event day
t, the following t-statistic is calculated:
t = AR
t
/a
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where:
AR = as defined in (2)
50 50
a = 1/100[ Z (AR - ( E AR./100)) ] '
C i—50 L 1—50 X
To test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return accumulation over
specified intervals (t,, t
? ), the Z test statistic is employed.
Z =
T
( n
~ 4 >
L (n-2)
1/2
CSAR
X
(3)
where:
N is the number of firms with abnormal returns
L is t_ - t + 1 the length of time over which abnormal returns
are measured
n is the number of observations
CSAR is the cumulation of average standardized abnormal returns
over interval I.
A derivation of the test Z statistic is shown in Appendix A.
VI. RESULTS
The abnormal return analysis was applied to the overall sample and
two partitions—domestic, wherein all parties were domestic; and inter-
national, with one of the ventures a foreign firm. The three sets of
results are presented in a similar manner. Individual day abnormal
returns (AR's), their accumulation (CAR's), and t-statistics are given
in one table, followed by interval tests of the significance of abnor-
mal return accumulation over pertinent intervals relative to the
announcement event.
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Overall Results
The individual day results are presented in Table 2 and there is
little evidence of statistically significant abnormal returns. The day
-1 abnormala return is .24 percent with a t-statistic of 1.85. As
noted earlier, if a joint venture announcement that was reported in the
WSJ on day was released before the close of trade on the previous
day, then the "true" event day is -1. Thus, the day -1 result can be
interpreted as indicating a positive stock, price response to the joint
venture announcement. However, the reaction is not particularly strong,
and we cannot reject the null hypotheses of zero abnormal return per-
formance at the announcement of a joint venture.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The results suggest that the formation of a joint venture is not
significantly different from a zero net present value project. Further-
more, the impact on stock price is similar to that of an acquirer in
whole-unit business combination.
Table 3 presents interval tests of the significance of abnormal
return accumulation over specified intervals relative to the announce-
ment. This shows little significant accumulation in the interval
immediately surrounding the announcement but a tendency for negative
accumulation prior to day and for positive accumulation over most
intervals subsequent to day 0. However, given the preponderence of
evidence in support of market efficiency, we do not attribute effects
other than over intervals immediately preceding and at the announcement
to the joint venture formation.
TABLE 2
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR'S), CUMULATIVE AVERAGE
ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR'S), AND T-STATISTICS—OVERALL SAMPLE
Dav AR CAR t-statistics
(%) (%)
-50 -0.05 -0.05 -0.35
-40 -0.15 -0.37 -1.15
-30 0.09 -0.40 0.66
-20 0.12 -0.88 0.90
-10 0.14 -1.30 1.03
-9
-0.06 -1.37 -0.49
-8 -0.04 -1.40 -0.29
-7 -0.14 -1.54 -1.05
-6 -0.05 -1.49 -0.41
-5 -0.23 -1.72 -1.79
-4 -0.04 -1.76 -0.28
-3 0.14 -1.62 1.06
-2 -0.05 -1.67 -0.30
-1 0.24 -1.43 1.85
0.08 -1.35 0.61
+1 -0.09 -1.44 -0.69
+2 -0.08 -1.52 -0.59
+3 0.23 .
:
-1.29 1.76
+4 0.02 -1.27 0.16
+5 -0.24 -1.50 -1.80
+6 0.17 -1.33 1.28
+7 0.06 -1.27 0.49
+8 -0.01 -1.28 -0.10
+9 0.16 -1.12 1.24
+10 -0.04 -1.16 -0.30
+20 0.12 -0.17 0.88
+ 30 -0.01 -0.32 -0.08
+40 -0.08 -0.23 -0.37
+50 0.02 -0.21 . 0.16
**Signif icant at the 1% level
*Signif icant at the 5% level
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Domestic Joint Ventures
Of the 208 joint ventures identified for this study, 90 are
domestic and 118 international. Insufficiency of data requirements for
the methodology resulted in a final sample of 80 domestic and 110
foreign venture events. In this section, the results of the separate
analysis of the domestic joint ventures are reported. As with the
overall sample, there is little evidence of significant abnormal
returns. Because of the partitioning and associated reduction in
sample size, a day -1 abnormal return of 0.22 percent (similar in
magnitude to the overall day -1 AR of 0.24%) has a t-statistic of only
0.96.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The interval accumulation significance tests of Table 5 indicate
little significance in the abnormal returns in the intervals immediately
surrounding the announcement.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
With the domestic sub-sample, there is little evidence that joint
ventures are other than zero net present value projects, and conse-
quently, there is no change in the value of participating firms.
International Joint Ventures
The analysis of international joint ventures provides further evi-
dence on the potential for international operations to provide diversi-
TABLE 3
Z-SCORES OF ABNORMAL RETURN OVER INTERVALS RELATIVE TO
THE ANNOUNCEMENT—OVERALL SAMPLE
Interval Z-score
-50 to -1.91
-25 to -2.22*
-20 to -10 -1.08
-10 to -0.08
-5 to 0.28
+1 to +5 -1.60
+1 to +10 0.21
+11 to +20 2.69**
+1 to +25 1.79
+1 to +50 0.89
**Signif icant at the 1% level
*Significant at the 5% level
TABLE 4
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR'S), CUMULATIVE AVERAGE
ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR'S), AND T-STATISTICS—DOMESTIC SUBSAMPLE
Dav AR CAR t-statistics
(%) (%)
-50 0.02 • 0.02 0.08
-40 0.09 -0.23 0.38
-30 -0.09 -0.46 -0.38
-20 -0.09 -1.80 -0.40
-10 0.30 -1.99 1.34
-9 0.07 -1.91 0.31
-8
-0.05 -1.96 -0.23
-7 0.00 -1.97 0.02
-6 0.30 -1.66 1.36
-5 -0.31 -1.97 -1.38
-4
-0.26 -2.23 -1.15
-3 0.14 -2.10 0.60
-2 0.13 -1.96 0.59
-1 0.22 -1.75 0.96
0.18 -1.57 0.73
+1 -0.30 -1.87 -1.33
+2 -0.08 -1.95 -0.35
+3 0.46 -1.49 2.08*
+4 -0.01 -1.49 -0.03
+5 -0.19 -1.69 -0.86
+6 0.14 -1.55 0.63
+7 0.02 -1.52 0.09
+8 -0.23 -1.75 -1.02
+9 0.25 -1.50 1.12
+10 -0.09 -1.59 -0.39
+20 0.30 -0.43 1.33
+30 -0.07 -1.50 -0.33
+40 -0.06 -1.56 -0.28
+50 0.06 -0.91 0.26
**Signif icant at the 1% level
*Significant at the 5% level
TABLE 5
Z-SCORES OF ABNORMAL RETURN OVER INTERVALS RELATIVE TO
THE ANNOUNCEMENT—DOMESTIC SUBSAMPLE
Interval Z-score
-50 to • -1.60
-25 to -2.14*
-20 to -10 -1.03
-10 to 1.93
-5 to 0.43
+1 to +5 -1.635
+1 to +10 -0.50
+11 to +20 1.75**
+1 to +25 0.56
+1 to +50 0.12
**Signif icant at the 1% level
*Significant at the 5% level
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fication services for investors who may face at least partially
segmented capital markets. The results for international ventures are
presented in Tables 6 and 7. There is little evidence of significant
valuation effects being associated with the formation of international
joint ventures. As one looks at the signs of the abnormal returns and
also the cumulative abnormal returns, there seems to be a dispropor-
tionate number of negatives. This may be caused by the fact that even
though the agreement of a joint venture may be valuable or at a mini-
mizing a zero NPV investment a joint venture announcement may convey
bad news about a corporation. To see this, consider a firm which wants
to make an investment which is considered to have a positive impact on
the firm's value; furthermore, knowledge about this investment plan is
well known. If the firm announces that it is going to undertake this
investment with some other organization, investors may revise downward
their expectations of the gains from the investment which now must be
shared between the partners of the joint venture, thereby putting down-
ward pressure on the firm's stock price.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Comparison of the results for the domestic and international sub-
samples shows that there is little difference in abnormal returns
around the announcement of a joint venture of either type. In relative
terms, the accumulation over intervals immediately preceding day is
greater for the domestic sub-sample. We cannot reject the null
hypothesis that international joint ventures provide no diversification
TABLE 6
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR'S), CUMULATIVE AVERAGE
ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR'S), AND T-STATISTICS—INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE
Day AR CAR t-s tat is tics
(%) (%)
-50 0.05 0.05 0.28
-40 -0.32 -0.30 -1.79
-30 0.26 -0.10 1.43
-20 0.12 0.12 0.65
-10 0.21 -0.46 1.19
-9
-0.09 -0.55 -0.51
-8
-0.03 -0.58 -0.19
-7
-0.31 -0.89 -1.73
-6 0.06 -0.83 0.31
-5
-0.12 -0.96 -0.69
-4 0.08 -0.88 0.43
-3
-0.12 -0.76 0.64
-2
-0.32 -1.08 -1.81
-1 0.19 -0.89 1.06
0.15 -0.74 0.85
+1 -0.07 -0.81 -0.41
+2 0.04 -0.78 0.21
+3 -0.06 , -0.83 -0.31
+4 0.09 -0.75 0.47
+5 -0.43 -1.18 -2.46*
+6 0.27 -0.90 1.54
+7 0.07 -0.84 0.37
+8 0.11 -0.73 0.60
+9 0.03 -0.69 0.19
+10 -0.02 -0.71 -0.11
+20 0.14 -0.06 0.80
+30 -0.16 0.53 -0.89
+40 -0.08 -0.14 -0.43
+50 0.09 -0.01 0.48
**Significant at the 1% level
*Significant at the 5% level
TABLE 7
Z-SCORES OF ABNORMAL RETURN OVER INTERVALS RELATIVE TO
THE ANNOUNCEMENT—INTERNATIONAL SUB-SAMPLE
Interval Z-score
-50 to -0.51
-25 to -1.18
-20 to -10 -0.79
-10 to -0.70
-5 to -0.27
+1 to +5 -1.36
+1 to +10 0.25
+11 to +20 1.75
+1 to +25 1.56
+1 to +50 0.63
**Signif icant at the 1% level
*Significant at the 5% level
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services for stockholders of domestic participant firms. Yet, with the
international sub-sample, we are testing a joint hypothesis that inter-
national joint ventures are zero net present value projects and that
joint ventures are not a means of providing valuable diversification
services for stockholders of the domestic firm. To the extent that the
net present value characteristics of domestic and joint ventures are
different, we are unable to separate the joint hypotheses tested in this
section.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study considered joint ventures as partial business com-
binations and contrasted them with the more familiare whole-unit busi-
ness combination by merger and tender offer. Joint ventures have been
emerging as an increasingly popular organizational form for both
domestic and international firms. There is considerable economic and
legal literature regarding joint ventures, but they have received rela-
tively little attention from a finance perspective. Analyzing a sample
of 208 joint ventures, this study found no significant evidence of
abnormal returns being associated with joint venture formation. Such
ventures appear to be approximately zero net present value projects,
and the wealth effect for stockholders of participating firms is similar
to that for acquirer firms in whole-unit combination.
Partitioning of the sample into domestic and international ventures
did not give rise to significantly different patterns of abnormal
return accumulation. There was little evidence that joint ventures
provide valuable diversification services in the short run. The for-
mation of a joint venture is a new operation which provides no history
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of performance. Given the relatively short period over which the
abnormal returns were analyzed we conclude that In the short run at
least shareholders perceive no diversification gains from the joint
ventures. It may be that over longer periods of time, shareholders may
perceive positive or negative effects as more information about the
success of failure of the joint venture becomes known. This obser-
vation opens up the possibility of future research into the questions
of not only are there long versus short run differences in the share-
holders perception of joint ventures, but also how effective is man-
agement in structuring the joint venture relationship so as to add
something of value to the firm. Further work is required in analyzing
the nature, location, and specific cash flows of international joint
ventures in order to determine if there are differences betweeen joint
ventures of U.S. and foreign partners when they are located in the U.S.
compared to those located outside of the U.S.
Rather than being the definitive work on joint ventures, this paper
provides a possible framework of analysis, raises some important issues,
and serves as a springboard for future research into this interesting
area of inquiry.
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Footnotes
Reflecting the similarity between partial and whole-unit com-
bination, this quotation is from an F.T.C. Merger Session (Merger
Policy Series, 1979).
2
The joint venture between General Motors and Toyota to produce
automobiles at Freemont, California is highlighting the relevance of
labor law to joint ventures.
3
The other" category included marketing, construction, exploration,
and drilling.
4
Studies that have addressed international capital market segmen-
tation and asset pricing implications include Graner, Litzenberger, and
Stehle (1976), Grubel (1976), Grubel and Fadner (1971), Lessard (1974),
Leug and Surnat (1970), Solnik (1974), and Subrahmanyan (1975).
In the following discussion, this will also be referred to as the
event day and as day (zero).
The relatively small magnitude of the AR to the test statistic
reflects the impact of a relatively large sample size on the variance
of returns of the portfolio of joint venturers. For the domestic joint
venture sub-sample, a similar magnitude Alt on day -1 has t-statistic
approximately 1/2 that of the overall sample.
-18-
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Appendix A
Derivation of the test Z-statistic
The standardized abnormal return for firm j in period t is defined
as:
where:
SAR. = AR. (S(AR. )) (1)
Jt Jt jt
9 -9 (R - R )
S
Z (AR. ) = a
Z
[l + 1/n + T. —^ 2_r-
t=l (R - R )
Z ... - , rat . m, r ,
a = estimated variance of the disturbance term from the
OLS estimation of the market model for security j.
R = The mean return on the value weighted market portfolio
over the parameter estimation interval for security j.
n = The number of observations (length of the interval)
over which the parameters are estimated (n = 150).
The average standardized abnormal return over N firms in day t is
defined as:
N
ASAR = 1/N I SAR.
3=1 ^
and the average standardized abnormal return over the interval I (with
trading day extrema t.. and t ) is:
ASAR
]^
= 1/L t ASAR
t=t
l
where:
L = t
2
- ^ + 1
The cumulation of average standardized abnormal returns over the inter-
val I is:
-A2-
CSAR = r ASAR
t=t
l
Then the statistic defined in (4) and (5) has a distribution that is
approximately standard abnormal when the number of firms (N) is suf-
ficiently large. The statistic is employed to test the null hypothesis
of zero abnormal accumulation over specified interval relative to the
event
.
ASAR^
Z j^ (2>
r
(n - 2) , , .1/2
[ (n - 4) 1
(NL)
N 1^2
-
[
—(izs 1 * CSARi (3)L
* (n - 2)
Q.E.D.
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